DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

Nevertheless, a detailed analysis shows the weaknesses of this apparent advance of democracy. As we will see with more detail, most of the referendum celebrated in Latin America arose due to the initiative of representative institutions (parliament or executive), and only eight arose from a popular initiative launched through the collection of voters signatures, and all of them in a single country: Uruguay. In many cases the referendum just tried to legitimise the power of the representative institution that summoned them, and in at least six cases they were used by authoritarian regimes with that objective.

On the other hand, the wealth of tools of direct democracy included in some national constitutions contrasts with the lack of experience in their application. In most of the cases those constitutional dispositions have not been developed in a legislative form.

n addition, the fact that in many cases the result of the referendum is not considered binding subtracts legitimacy to the tool and facilitates its use to manipulate the citizens and to turn it into a plebiscitary instrument for the legitimisation of power.

We can distinguish two different stages in the transition to democracy in the countries that passed from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. There was a strong advance of democracy during the eighties, disappearing most of the military dictatorships that covered the continent as a result of the cold war. In this same decade there was a big wave of democratic enthusiasm in the whole continent, which citizens mainly approved the reinstallation of the democratic institutions.

The second stage, along the nineties, has shown instead a strong disappointment with the democratic institutions from the part of the citizens. The economic crisis that has crossed the continent has helped to this perception, but the main reason has been the use of those institutions to reinforce the power of the various political elites and for the personal enrichment of the people around those elites.

On the other hand, the lack of democratic respect demonstrated by the representative politicians in many of those countries, and therefore the use of political violence to solve the power struggles among the various factions, has reinforced the disappointment of the citizens. This questioning of representative democracy in the whole continent was addressed through the constitutional reforms affecting many countries, specifically through the introduction of several tools of direct democracy in those constitutions.

As a result of this, most of the constitutions reformed along the nineties have introduced various levels of direct democracy. The only country that already had direct democratic liberties was Uruguay, which enjoys them from the third decade of the past century.

Another consequence of the lack of trust in the democratic institutions was the arrival to power of populist politicians who attributed all evils to representative democracy, as Fujimori in Peru or Bucaram in Ecuador. As we will see later, the praises to direct democracy from those politicians demonstrated their vacuity when other people tried to use these tools to reduce and control the power they possessed.

This, jointly with the bad design of the tools in most of the cases (excessive number of signatures required to launch a legislative or constitutional initiative, non binding referenda, etc.) have posed as well certain questions about the validity of direct democracy in Latin America. Those arguments are being used persistently by the politicians controlling the representative institutions to disqualify direct democracy.

The conclusion is, therefore, bittersweet. Several countries have included political liberties referring to direct democracy in their constitutions, making of those texts some of the most advanced in this respect, but those liberties have been seldom applied and have design flaws which could make them completely unworkable. The only country where the citizens have used direct democracy to influence national legislation is Uruguay, where on the other hand have enjoyed these liberties since more of 70 years. The other country where those liberties are starting to be used , Venezuela, is under an increasing environment of political violence.

We will start with a small comparative analysis of the situation of direct democracy in the continent, what will allow us to classify each country according the scope and application of those tools. Later we will detail all popular referenda celebrated in the continent in the last 30 years, we will analyse in more detail the only example of actual direct democracy in the continent in Uruguay, and we will offer some conclusions.

Before comparing the constitutional provisions referring to direct democracy in American countries, we will start defining the most important tools of direct democracy used all over the world.

We consider that direct democracy could be summarised in just two tools: the mandatory referendum to reform the constitution or certain types of ordinary laws, and the popular initiative, that is to say, the celebration of a binding referendum once certain number of signatures have been collected. The last mechanism can be classified as well based on what is consulted in the referendum: the approval of a new law, the derogation of an existing law or the dismissal of an elected representative (what is known as recall in Anglo-Saxon countries). In addition, we have included the legislative petition, that from the collection of certain number of signatures forces the parliament to discuss the introduction of a new law or the modification of an existing one, but that doesn’t imply the celebration of a binding referendum in case the parliament refuses to approve the proposed law. Let’s describe each of those mechanisms with more detail:

Legislative petition: from the collection of certain number of signatures, any citizen can promote the discussion by the parliament of a new law, or the modification of an already existing law. The utility of this tool depends on the number of signatures required (an excessive number will make it unworkable) and on the possibility of defending the proposal in the parliament on the part of the petition promoters. However, this tool does not implies the celebration of a binding referendum in case the parliament does not make the promoted legislative changes, being this the reason why its real utility to control the power of the political elites is practically null.

Legislative Initiative: the main difference with the previous mechanism is that, in this case, if the parliament does not make the legislative changes proposed by the promoters of the initiative, the call of a binding referendum on this proposal is required, in some cases jointly with possible counterproposals of the legislative assembly. In some North American states the parliamentary discussion is not required, and once gathered the signatures a referendum is automatically summoned. This is called Direct Initiative.

Elected representatives’ recall: in this case, after the collection of signatures, a referendum is called to dismiss an elected representative.

Constitutional Initiative: It is a mechanism similar to the legislative initiative, but it is used to propose reforms to the constitution. In some countries, like Uruguay, it is the only type of initiative accepted by the constitution, what makes that constitutional reforms are introduced covering subjects that, more logically, would fit in ordinary legislation.

Abrogative Referendum: In this case signatures are collected to call a referendum in which a law already approved by the parliament can be rejected. In case that the consultation is approved, the law in question is repealed.

Mandatory Referendum: It is the only tool of direct democracy in which it is not precise to collect signatures of citizens. It is a warranty by which all or certain modifications to some laws (normally the constitution) must be voted in referendum before being approved. The scope of this tool varies depending on whether any modification to the law should be consulted or only some specific provisions.

In the table shown below we indicate what of those tools are included in the constitution of each country. It is also indicated the constitutional article that applies and the limitations established in each case.

COUNTRY	PETITION	INITIATIVE	RECALL	CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE	ABROGATIVE REFERENDUM	MANDATORY AND BINDING REFERENDUM
Argentina	YES Excluding budgetary and fiscal issues, international treaties and penal legislation. Required the signatures of 3% of the census. Art. 39	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO Only the president and the congress could call a referendum, which could be binding or not. Art. 40.
Brazil	YES Article 14 establishes the plebiscite, the referendum and the popular initiative, without developing its modalities. Art. 61/2 fixes a 1% of the voters in at least five regions.	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO art. 49 gives the congress the possibility of calling referendum and plebiscites, but without mentioning its binding character.
Chile	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO Only for constitutional reforms in case of disagreement between the congress and the president Art. 117 Art. 5 establish the plebiscite. Art. 32 indicates that it is a prerogative of the president, and art. 119 fixes the milestones of the process.
Colombia	YES Art. 155 allows 5% of the voters to send an initiative to congress, but it does not imply the automatic calling of a referendum.	NO	YES Art. 40 and 103 recognise the right to the recall of elected representatives, but it does not develop the procedure.	NO According art. 155 and 375, 5% of voters could propose reforms to the constitution, but it does not imply the celebration of a referendum	YES According art. 170, 10% of voters could call an abrogative referendum. It requires a quorum of 25% of the census. Budgetary, fiscal and international issues are explicitly excluded.	YES, but only for civil rights and the mechanisms of popular participation, if it is required by 5% of the census (art. 377). The president or the congress CAN call a referendum in case of constitutional reform. It is required a quorum of 25% of the census (art. 378)
Ecuador	YES Signatures of 0,25% of the census are required. Budgetary issues are excluded. Art. 146	YES Required signatures of 8% of the census to submit to referendum issues of significant importance, excluding constitutional reforms. Art. 105	YES Only for provincial deputies. Signatures of 30% of census required. SI Art. 109 y 110.	NO 1% of census could propose constitutional reforms, but it does not imply the calling of a referendum. (art. 281)	NO	NO Congress or the president could call a referendum, but it is not mandatory. Art. 283
Guatemala	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES Only for reforms not discussed by a constitutional convention. Art. 280
Panama	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES Only issues regarding the Channel status (art. 319). It is one of the modalities to reform the constitution. Art. 283
Peru	YES Recognised by articles 31 and 107. However, its use is not regulated.	YES According article 32 legislative initiatives can be submitted to a referendum. However, its use is not regulated.	YES Article 31 recognises the right to recall elected representatives, but its use is not regulated. On the other side, article 32 does not include the recall among the questions, which could be submitted to a referendum.	YES It can be promoted by the signatures of 0,3% of census. Art. 206	NO	YES Except when the reform has been approved by the deputies of two consecutive legislative terms Art. 206
Uruguay	NO	NO Not in practice, but article 79 guarantees the right to legislative initiative, though it has never been applied, and it could contradict other articles of the constitution (arts. 85.6, 86, 133)	NO	YES Article 331 requires signatures of 10% of census and a 35% quorum.	YES Article 79 requires signatures of 25% of census. Fiscal matters are excluded.	YES Art. 331 of the constitution.
Venezuela	YES Article 204 recognises the right to legislative petition if 0,1% of census promotes it.	YES Article 71 allows to submit to referendum any question of national interest if 10% of the census requires it. Article 73 mentions the right to submit to referendum a low if 2/3 of the congress requires it, without mentioning popular initiative. Also, this article allows to submit to referendum international questions if it is promoted by 15% of census.	YES Article 70 recognises this right, and no. 72 fixes as a requirement the collection of signatures of 20% of the census. The recall will be accepted if the number of votes favouring it is higher than the number obtained by the representative in the last elections, and a quorum of 25% of census.	YES Article 70 recognises this right and no. 341 regulates it, requiring the signatures of 15% of the census. SI	YES Article 74 allows the call of an abrogative referendum from the initiative of 10% of the census, and 5% of the census to repeal laws decreed by the president. It's required a quorum of 40% and budgetary, fiscal, human rights and international treaties issues are excluded.	YES Article 344 makes mandatory to submit to referendum any constitutional reform.
El Salvador	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES But only in case of union with another central American republic
Nicaragua	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Paraguay	YES Article 123 recognises this right. Its regulation will be established by an specific law.	NO Article 123 does not require the call of a referendum in case of legislative initiatives. Also, article 121 mentions that referenda don’t need to be binding, and no. 122 excludes issues of international relationships, expropriations, fiscal and budgetary issues, etc.	NO	YES A reform could be required by 30000 voters, according article 290.	NO	YES Article 290 makes mandatory the call of a referendum to approve constitutional reforms.
Bolivia	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Costa Rica	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Honduras	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Mexico	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Rep. Dominican	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO

It is important to note that only in three cases the direct democratic provisions included in the constitution have been developed into a formal law. Those are the cases of Uruguay (electoral law), Colombia (participation law) and Guatemala (electoral law). In the case of Venezuela the constitutional articles are quite specific regarding the implementation of those tools, so they can be applied even without further legislative development.

Based on the data shown in the previous table we are going to propose a classification of countries of Latin America based in the scope and depth of the measures of direct democracy included in their constitutions, as well as in their experience in the application of these measures in each country. With this purpose, we assume that a country disposes of actual tools of direct democracy when it is possible, from a popular initiative launched through the collection of signatures, to call a binding referendum to propose a legislative change or the recall of an elected representative .In other words, when a country only has the right to legislative petition (that is, without the obligation to call a binding referendum) or the right to the mandatory referendum for constitutional reforms, we will consider that the mechanisms of direct democracy are minimum.

In addition, we have considered the experience in the practical application of the tools of direct democracy that lead to a binding referendum. With these premises, we have divided the different countries in four groups:

The only country included in this group is Uruguay, since it is the only place in the whole area where binding referenda have been called arising from the collection of voters’ signatures. As we will see later, eight referenda have been celebrated promoted by a popular initiative. From those, three were abrogative referenda and the rest where constitutional reforms.

Although the number of referenda celebrated in some countries, as Ecuador, is also quite high, they haven’t been included in this group because none of them arose from a popular initiative, but were promoted by representative institutions as the legislative or the executive branches.

Due to the importance of the Uruguayan experience, a specific section has been dedicated to describe this model with more detail. It will be enough to mention here, therefore, that although the Uruguayan constitution has less mechanisms of direct democracy included than some other Latin American countries (it only considers the abrogative referendum and the popular initiative to constitutional reform), it is the only country where those tools have been applied.

Taking into account only the constitutional provisions included in some of the countries of this group, we are facing some of the more advanced semi-direct democracies in the world. However, when we review the list of referenda celebrated in the last thirty years in those countries, we found that many of those mechanisms have not been applied up to now, at least regarding the referenda promoted through the collection of voters signatures.

It is true that in most of the cases those mechanisms were included in their constitutions in the last years, so we could think this to be the reason why those mechanism have not been developed as an specific law. However, the design flaws shown in many of those provisions (for instance, not making clear the binding nature of the referenda, or requiring a disproportionate number of signatures to launch an initiative) make us to be pessimistic regarding the possibility of those provisions being effectively applied in the short term.

The case of Venezuela is especially important, due to the wealth of direct democratic tools included in her constitution. In addition to the right of legislative petition and the mandatory request to call a binding referendum in case of any constitutional reform, the Venezuelan constitution includes the rest of mechanisms of direct democracy that we have mentioned previously.

However, both the few time passed from the new constitution approval, in 1999, and the climate of political violence that the country has suffered from the arrival of president Chavez to the executive power, make us to doubt whether those direct democratic tools included in the constitution will be consistently applied in the future. However the Venezuelan constitution is one of the most advanced in the world in terms of direct democracy.

Although the constitution does not regulate specifically the legislative initiative, article no. 71 allows the call of referendum for any question of national interest from the signatures of 10% of the voters. Since this article is not more specific, we understand that among those questions of national interest is included the approval of new laws or legislative reforms considered important by the citizens.

Nevertheless, The number of signatures required to launch each of those mechanisms is excessive to be practical. The requirement of the signatures of 20% of voters to recall an elected representative is disproportionate, and it will allow to start the process only to those groups with already a big capacity of mobilisation or with strong economic power, as it is being demonstrated by the recall process to dismiss president Chavez that is happening as we write this document. In some other case, as the abrogative referenda for presidential legislative decrees, the percentage of signatures required is much more reasonable (5% of voters).

The fact that the constitutional provisions have not been developed in legislative form is not so important in the Venezuelan case as in the rest of countries included in this group. This is because the constitution is, generally, sufficiently specific as to implement the mechanisms mentioned here.

It deserves a specific mention the article no. 73 that allows the citizens to call a referendum to deal with national sovereignty issues. If this definition includes those questions referring to a possible declaration of war, and to the neutrality of the country, it is one of the most democratically advanced provisions included in the constitution of any country, and of special relevance from the point of view of democratic pacifism.

Nevertheless, the climate of political violence that the country is suffering in the last years is preventing a reasonable application of these mechanisms. As we will see in the conclusions of this study, the absence of political violence and the strength of the democratic institutions are a necessary premise for the implementation of direct democracy in any place, and especially in latinoamerica. This premise is absent in the Venezuelan situation.

President Chavez, who acceded to power in December of 1999 with ample electoral support (1) (56.2% of the votes) and who was confirmed a year later with an even better result (59.75%), promoted a new constitution that, apart of introducing mechanisms of direct democracy, increased the presidencialist character of the Venezuelan state. The new constitution introduced in addition other changes that, in

general, strengthened the power of the president. The president obtains more powers and the duration of the presidential term is increased to six years, although a limitation of two terms is also included. In addition, a parliament with only one chamber is established, and two new powers are introduced (additionally to the three accepted traditionally: legislative, judiciary and executive): the electoral power (an independent electoral commission) and the civic power (through the tools of direct democracy).

The political situation in Venezuela makes difficult to hope that the advanced tools of direct democracy will be applied in an impartial way. The Armed Forces have been politicised by initiative of the President. The army can deliberate in political issues and it is relatively autonomous respecting the civilian authorities. Furthermore, it has a rising role in the management of public administration, being each day more common to find army people in government key positions. It is important to mention the so called "Bolivar Plans", through which some resources are subtracted from the municipal and regional budgets and assigned to the army to develop public works, health care programs, etc. This politicisation of the army not only have found resistance in the armed forces but it is an extremely dangerous tool in Latin America. We cannot forget that the continent has just abandoned a period of violent military dictatorships.

On the other hand, the Venezuelan economy is under a strong pressure. The Venezuelan currency, Bolivar, has been overvalued to contain inflation avoiding the implementation of unpopular policies, what has caused an strong discontent in the exporting sector and an important flight of capitals. Although the oil bonanza of 1999 and 2000 had maintained reasonably this scheme, accompanied by strong investment in social policies and in the redistribution of wealth (expropriation of large estates non operated correctly, etc.), the fall of the price of the fuel barrel (which reached up to 25 US$) together with the lack of investment in the country has restrained the recovery of the job market. This has caused that the Central de Trabajadores de Venezuela (the main union) has joined the protests of the opposition against President Chavez. The recover in the oil prices when this report is being written coud affect again the Venezuelan situation.

In addition, the international approach of the president, based on a strong nationalism that foments disputes with neighbouring countries (specially Colombia and Guyana) and on a change of alliances that supposes to move away of the United States and to approach China, the Arab countries and the European Union, has reduced further the foreign investment in the country.

On the other hand, the organisations supporting President Chavez have not demonstrated experience in the mobilisation of the citizens, and they are being punished by cases of corruption that are diminishing their popular support.

When these lines are being written the opposition Coordinadora Democratica has announced that it has 3.6 million signatures of citizens to call a referendum to recall president Chavez mandate (2) (a minimum of 2.4 million is necessary). Although international observers were satisfied by the process of collection of signatures, President Chavez summoned his followers to take the street to prevent the collection of signatures, which he described as a "megafraud", although its call had little response. Although the honesty of the opposition at the time of collecting signatures is questionable, the reaction of the president to interfere with a process of direct democracy appealing to popular violence raises doubts about his democratic sincerity. Nevertheless, at the end of January 2004 the president announced his acceptance to the results of the referendum. However, in February the electoral council ruled that the opposition was 600,000 signatures short of the 2.43 million necessary, but that more than 1 million signatures may be reconfirmed. The court's electoral chamber ruled in March that 876,000 disputed signatures should be counted, unless signers disavow them. The constitutional chamber overturned that ruling a week later, saying it violated due process. In this moment they are trying to get an agreement for the celebration of the referendum before 19 august, because according to the constitution if President Chavez is recalled after this date, which marks the equator of the presidential term, he will be substituted by the vice-president until the end of the presidential term, in 2006. (3)

The constitution of Colombia includes the revocation of elected representatives and the abrogative referendum. Nevertheless, the first political freedom has not been developed in a specific law, and the constitution does not indicate the number of signatures required nor the obligation to call a referendum after that collection. This makes impossible to apply this mechanism at the present time. With respect to the abrogative referendum, the amount of necessary signatures (10% of the census) makes its real application very difficult.

On the other hand, the Colombian constitution admits the citizen initiative for constitutional reform from a moderate number of signatures (5% of the census), but it does not imply the celebration of a referendum to ratify this reform. This makes this tool completely useless, since the parliament can decide not to do anything on the matter. The same applies to the legislative initiative, that requires the same number of signatures, but it does not guarantee a mandatory referendum if the parliament does not accept the proposed legislative changes. In these two cases the number of signatures required for the small results obtained makes us doubt whether any interest group could be interested in launching such a process.

Finally, the call of referendum in case of constitutional reform is only allowed for very specific issues, and it requires the collection of a relatively high number of signatures.

Therefore , Colombia is a very instructive example of how some mechanisms of direct democracy could be introduced in the constitution with the sufficient design flaws to make their real use impossible. This has been demonstrated by the null use of these mechanisms since the approval of the present constitution. The only referendum called through the collection of citizen’s signatures was an informal one, called by the students organisation "Septima Papeleta" to induce the reform of the constitution in March 1990. The exemplary organisation of the referendum, the high participation and the overwhelming majority favouring constitutional reform made that the Supreme Court considered binding the result. Some months later, the president of the republic called a formal referendum where it was again approved to summon a constitutional convention, which wrote the present constitution.

If we only look to the number of referendum celebrated in Ecuador (in five occasions, and on 34 different subjects) it is possible to think that we are in a country where Direct Democracy is not only protected constitutionally, but it is also applied. However, a more detailed analysis shows us that Ecuador is, if something, an example of how the bad design of direct democracy mechanism and the lack of honesty in its application can derive in a greater demotivation of the citizens

The Ecuadorian constitution admits both the legislative initiative and the recall of elected representatives when certain amount of signatures is collected (8% of the census, in the case of the initiative). Nevertheless, none of these tools has been used since they were included in the constitution. All the referendum celebrated in the country were called from the initiative of the president of the republic, except for the one approving the new constitution.

In fact, the experience of Ecuador is a clear instance of using the tools of Direct Democracy not with the objective of knowing the position of the citizens but of fortifying the executive authority. The referendum celebrated (except for the constitutional approval) were not binding, and even when they were approved, like in the 1997 referendum-survey, the new policies were never implemented. We can only have the hope that the constitutional provisions allowing legislative initiatives and recall would be used in the future.

Peru is another example of a constitution with advanced democratic provisions that have not been applied never (except in the referendum to approve the new constitution). Also in Peru the introduction of the mechanisms of Direct Democracy came from populist politicians, in this case president Fujimori, who wanted in the first instance to weaken the institutions of representative democracy.

The Peruvian constitution allows the legislative initiative (although it does not develop the procedures to apply it), the constitutional reform and the mandatory constitutional referendum. In addition, in the case of the initiative for constitutional reform the number of signatures is very reasonable (only 0.3% of the census).

Nevertheless, there is a serious flaw in the design of the recall of elected representatives. Although formally the right to recall elected representatives is allowed (art. 31), the same constitution excludes this subject from all those that can be submitted to referendum (art. 32). We believe that an initiative to recall elected representatives that is not launched through the collection of signatures and that does not derive in a binding referendum does not deserve that name. We do not know if this is an inadvertent error in the design of the tools of Direct Democracy or an attempt to deactivate this political freedom from the beginning

Peru is also an example, as in Ecuador, where a constitution with advanced democratic provisions cannot be applied in practice. Not even one referendum has been called applying the political rights described above, what is not so surprising, if you know who were the institutional promoters of Direct Democracy in Peru. President Fujimori was responsible of a self-coup in 1992 that was followed by a new constitution one year later. Although president Fujimori was re-elected by ample majority in 1996, soon it was clear his lack of democratic honesty. The Peruvian constitution only allows for two presidential mandates, to which soon the president supporters tried to oppose. They tried to avoid this limitation of terms through a Law of Authentic Interpretation of the Constitution, and through the intervention in all branches of the state (judiciary, legislative, etc.).

Another example is the attempt to submit to referendum the privatisation of the state-owned company of oil, Petroperú, during the regime of Fujimori. This attempt was resisted in several ways: indicating that it was a budgetary subject, and therefore excluded from the subjects that can be submitted to referendum, or trying to elevate the number of signatures to a 20% of the census. In this one, like in other cases, the regime of Fujimori was able to deactivate the use of the direct democratic tools when it went against his interests. Of course, they never tried to develop the provisions of direct democracy included in the constitution through an specific law. This is the reason why, even after Fujimori´s fall, Peru remains a semidirect democracy only on paper.

Finally, Paraguay does not have practical experience in the application of the measures of direct democracy included in its constitution. This allows the initiative to constitutional reform from 30000 signatures of voters, what is a reasonable proportion of the electorate, as well as the mandatory referendum for the constitutional reform. Nevertheless, it has not been celebrated any referendum in the last thirty years. The constitutional provisions have not been developed through an specific law.

In addition, some informal referendum have been celebrated, some with great influence on the political events. It is the case of Colombia in March of 1990, where a referendum was called by the students organisation "Septima Papeleta" to induce the reform of the constitution. The high participation and the overwhelming majority favouring constitutional reform made that the Supreme Court considered binding the result. Some months later, the president of the republic called a formal referendum where it was again approved to summon a constitutional convention, which wrote the present constitution.

Another case of informal referendum with great repercussion are the ones celebrated in Brazil in 2000 on the maintenance of the agreements with the IMF and on the payment of the external debt. In this case, the citizens rejected the proposal.

COUNTRY	DATE	ISSUE	RESULT	COMMENTS
Argentina	Nov. 84	Laudo Beagle	Approved	Not binding
Brazil	Apr. 93	Monarchy or republic	Republic	Binding
Brazil	Apr. 93	Parliamentarism or presidentialism	Presidentialism	Binding .
Bolivia	Jun 86	Several economic measures.	Rejected	Economical measures promoted by government to fight against a hyperinflation situation.
Colombia	Dec. 90	Constitutional reform	Approved	Consult pushed by the president after the Supreme Court established that the informal referendum called by the students movement "septima papeleta" to reform the constitution was binding. At the same time, the representatives for the constitutional assembly were elected.
Colombia	Oct. 97	Support to the peace process	Approved	Initiative of several NGO and with government support.
Chile	Jan. 78	Legitimisation of general Pinochet´s rule.	Approved	Referendum called by General Pinochet to legitimise his regime, facing international protests due to the human rights violations in Chile. The beginning of the questions tells us everything about its purpose: "In front of international aggression against the Fatherhood’s government, I support general Pinochet in his defence of Chile’s dignity…"
Chile	Sep. 80	New constitution	Approved	Referendum legitimising general Pinochet´s regime.
Chile	Oct. 88	Extension of the rule of general Pinochet	Rejected	Extension for 8 years of general Pinochet´s mandate.
Chile	Jun. 89	Constitutional reform	Approved
Ecuador	Jan. 78	New constitution	Approved
Ecuador	Jun. 86	Allowing independent candidates.	Rejected	Not binding
Ecuador	Ago. 94	Consult-survey (several issues)	All approved, except one issue	Not binding, and initiated by the president. The issues submitted to referendum where: Reviewing of the constitution by the parliament. Participation of independent candidates in elections. Administration of the budget by the parliament (rejected) Division of the budget in thematic areas (versus division according provinces) Re-election of elected representatives not restricted. Election of members of parliament in one round. Recognition of double nationality.
Ecuador	Nov. 95	Consult-survey (several issues)	All rejected	Not binding. The issues submitted to referendum were: Decentralisation of health authorities. Privatisation of social security. Distribution of expenses among the provinces. Abolition of the right of strike in the public sector. Authority of the president to dissolve parliament. Terms of four years for local authorities. Terms of two years for the congress president Implementation of the reforms in 90 days. Judiciary reform Legal guarantees for civil servants. Appointment of the constitutional court.
Ecuador	May. 97	Consult-survey (several issues)	All approved	Not binding. The issues submitted to referendum were: Dismissal of ex president Abdala Bucaram Confirmation of new president Fabian Alarcon Creation of a constitutional assembly. Direct election of the constitutional assembly. Limitation of campaign expenses in elections. Modification of candidates lists from the voters. Presidential election in one round. Banning of political parties that don’t obtain more than 5% of votes in two consecutive elections. Composition of the supreme court. Responsibility of parliament to select the executives of state-owned companies. Modernisation of the judiciary. Appointment of judiciary authorities in the supreme court. Dismissal of elected representatives who break the law. Implementation of reforms in 60 days after the referendum. Most of those decisions were not implemented after the referendum.
Guatemala	Jan. 94	Constitutional reform	Approved
Guatemala	May. 99	Constitutional reform to implement the peace treaties.	Rejected
Guyana	Jun. 78	Mandatory referendum in case of certain constitutional reforms.	Approved	Started by the president.
Panamá	Oct. 77	Approval to the Channel Treaty	Approved	Started by general Torrijos to legitimise the Panama Channel treaty with USA
Panamá	Apr. 83	Constitutional reform	Approved	Legitimisation of general Noriega´s regime.
Panamá	Nov. 92	Constitutional reform	Rejected
Panamá	Ago. 98	Constitutional reform	Rejected
Perú	Oct. 93	New constitution	Approved	Legitimisation of president Fujimori´s regime
Surinam	Sep. 87	New constitution	Approved	Called by the military junta after the coup of 1982
Uruguay	Nov. 71	Limitation of presidential terms.	Rejected	Started by the president.
Uruguay	Nov. 80	New constitution	Rejected	Legitimisation of the military regime
Uruguay	Apr. 89	Repeal to the general amnesty to the military.	Approved	Abrogative referendum that managed to repeal the amnesty for the military.
Uruguay	Nov. 89	Salary adjustment for pensioners.	Approved	Constitutional reform launched through popular initiative. The initiative was promoted by the pensioners union.
Uruguay	Dec. 92	Privatisation of telephone company.	Approved	Abrogative referendum launched through popular initiative.
Uruguay	Ago. 94	Separation of municipal and national elections.	Rejected	Constitutional reform approved by parliament but rejected in the referendum.
Uruguay	Nov. 94	Protection to pensioners.	Approved	Constitutional reform launched by popular initiative promoted by the pensioners union.
Uruguay	Nov. 94	To assure 27% of the budget for education.	Rejected	Constitutional reform promoted through popular initiative by the teachers union.
Uruguay	Dec. 96	Electoral system change.	Approved	Constitutional reform promoted by parliament.
Uruguay	Oct. 99	Banning to members of state-owned companies to become candidates.	Rejected	Constitutional reform promoted through popular initiative.
Uruguay	Oct. 99	To fix a percentage of the budget to fund the judiciary branch.	Rejected	Constitutional reform promoted through popular initiative.
Uruguay	Dec. 03	Repeal of the law for privatisation of the oil company ANCAP	Approved	Abrogative referendum promoted through popular initiative.
Venezuela	Apr. 99	Election of constitutional assembly.	Approved	Start of president Chavez´s reforms.
Venezuela	Dec. 99	Constitutional reform	Approved
Venezuela	Dec. 2000	Renovation of union leaders.	Approved	Only 22% of census participated. It was promoted by the parliament.

Uruguay is the only example in Latin America where there is a consistent use of the tools of direct democracy recognised by the constitution. Also, it is the only country that enjoys those political freedoms since more than 70 years, while in the rest of countries covered by this report those tools have been included in the constitution in the last two decades. The only novelty, introduced in 1966, is the abrogative referendum.

The main tools of Direct Democracy available in Uruguay at national level are the obligatory constitutional referendum, the initiative to the constitutional reform and the abrogative referendum. In the last two cases, the number of signatures required to launch the process is too high: 10% for constitutional reform and 25% for the abrogation of laws.

Although article 79 of the constitution recognises the right to popular initiative, this has not been applied anytime, and apparently contradicts other articles of the same constitution which reserve the legislative initiative to the legislative and executive branches (articles 85,6, 86 and 133). Due to the non-existence of the citizen initiative for regular legislation, the initiative to the constitutional reform has been used to introduce legislation that by its nature would correspond to ordinary laws. Five referendum for constitutional reform have been called, of which only two have been approved (in 1989 and 1994, in both cases in reference to the rights of pensioners).

In addition, three abrogative referendum have been celebrated (on the law of amnesty to the military, on the privatisation of the telephone company and the last one, in December of 2003, on the privatisation of the oil company ANCAP), which were approved by the citizens. In year 2001 the collection of signatures began to repeal a law that allowed the privatisation of the telecommunications company ANTEL-ANCEL, being reached the number required in January of 2002. Nevertheless, and in spite of doubts on the possible unconstitutionality of the initiative (since it affected tributary subjects), the government decided to repeal the law unilaterally.

The national abrogative referendum was regulated by a specific law in 1989 that has been modified in the year 2000. In the 1989 law, the initiative mechanism was very complex. Basically, from the collection of signatures amounting to 0.5% of the census, the voters were summoned to a pre-referendum in which it was decided if the questioned law must be submitted to an abrogative referendum. If a minimum of 25% of the census approved this pre-referendum, the definitive referendum was called to repeal the law. If the proposal was rejected in the pre-referendum, a year later it was called a second pre-referendum with the same question. The main disadvantage of this mechanism is the excessive number of popular consultations, what may overwhelm the citizens. The great advantage is that the expenses of the collection of signatures to reach 25% of the census required by the constitution were assumed by the state through the pre-referendum.

This law was modified in 2000, increasing from the 0.5 to 2% the number of signatures required to call a pre-referendum (that will follow the same procedure as explained above) and allowing as well the possibility of calling the abrogative referendum through the collection of signatures amounting at least 25% of the census (in which case is not precise the pre-referendum (5)).

We can see in Uruguay that the popular initiative has been used several times to resist the globalisation wave that affects the country, mainly with regard to the privatisation of state-owned companies and in the protection of the rights of the pensioners. We can see also that these initiatives have been successful in four cases (twice in protection of the pensioners and other two preventing privatisation of state companies), and in another case the collection of signatures managed to push the government to repeal the law unilaterally, to prevent a possible defeat in referendum (the mentioned case of ANTEL-ANCEL).

Traditionally the Uruguayan left has supported the use of mechanisms of direct democracy, and it has participated actively in several popular initiatives. The traditional Uruguayan parties (Colorado Party and Blanco Party) have treated, however, to reject the use of the direct democracy tools based on its supposed danger for representative democracy. This division of opinions reflects the greater power of the right in the congress, and not necessarily the superior democratic credentials of the Uruguayan left (6). We can see in the Uruguayan case a situation already observed in other countries where direct democracy was implemented many years ago: it is generally an instrument introduced by the left (as it happened in Switzerland or the United States), but neutral in its results.

At the present time there is a lively debate about direct democracy in Uruguay, motivated mainly by the supposed fatigue of an electorate who must participate often in electoral consultations. The mechanism used for the celebration of abrogative referendum can aggravate this perception of the Uruguayan citizens, but the number of referendum in Uruguay in the last years does not seem to us excessive, if we compare it with other countries. It is not difficult to suspect that this debate is in part fomented by the traditional political parties, specially the conservatives, which don’t feel comfortable with the institutions of direct democracy.

We can conclude that Uruguay is the only country where the institutions of direct democracy are not only included in her constitution but have been applied in several occasions, although most of them in the last two decades. Nevertheless, these institutions are limited by several flaws in their design, what makes difficult their application. The most critical problem is the excessive number of signatures required to call both an abrogative referendum and the initiative for constitutional reform, what makes difficult the initiative to those groups that are not enough powerful from an economic or organisational point of view. Due to this reason, all the referendum called until now have been promoted by the political parties or by strong unions.

On the other hand, the complex mechanism required for the abrogative referendum, that implies in some cases the celebration of up to three referendum to consult only one issue, causes a fatigue in the electorate that represents a danger to direct democracy. In addition, the ambiguity of the constitution with respect to the regular legislative initiative has prevented its practical application until now.

It is possible to hope, nevertheless, that a future reform of these mechanisms to reduce the number of required signatures will result in more frequent use of these political liberties. The stability and political education of the Uruguayan people, on the other hand, seems to guarantee that these tools will be used in a more practical way in the future.

We can derive from the present study two basic conclusions on the situation of direct democracy in Latin America:

The main premises that we can establish to guarantee the proper use of the direct democracy tools are the existence of an stable democratic state with an effective political pluralism, as well as an established freedom of expression and information. On the other hand, this cannot be understood like a limitation of direct democracy, since these same premises apply to the success of representative democracy in those same countries. We should not forget that many of those mechanisms have been introduced by authoritarian regimes with the only purpose of attacking representative democracy. Experience shows that those same regimes ignore the same mechanisms of direct democracy that they have established.

As we can see if we analyse the referendum celebrated from 1970, the political elites only apply voluntarily the mechanisms of direct democracy in two occasions: when they are sure to win and when they need some kind of extraparliamentary legitimisation to hold his position in their internal fights. Even in these cases, often the decisions confirmed in referendum never are applied in practice, as it happened in Ecuador.

On the other hand, the participation level is usually low, what should not surprise us if we consider the lack of democratic honesty of the political elites when they decide to use these mechanisms.

We have found also several cases of bad design of these tools of direct democracy. A promising germ of direct democracy as the represented by Uruguay can be aborted due to the excessive number of signatures necessary to initiate these mechanisms. In other cases, as in Ecuador, the fact that the referendum is not binding makes it absolutely ineffective. In many other cases (the recall of elected representatives in Peru, or the ordinary legislative initiative in Uruguay) is the ambiguity of the constitution with regard to these mechanisms which makes difficult its practical application.

The main problem that affects direct democracy in the continent is, nevertheless, the lack of honesty in its use on the part of the political elites. As we have seen in the Venezuelan case, a situation of political violence is also a very important limitation when applying these mechanisms.

Another example of a bad use of direct democracy have been found in Ecuador, where a weak executive authority used those tools to legitimise its policies, ignoring later the decisions of the citizens. This use of direct democracy is dangerous not only to itself, but also to democracy in general, and may cause a distrust from the citizens towards all democratic institutions.

However, the examples of bad use of direct democracy in Latin America are not an argument against direct democracy itself, but against a messy design of those mechanisms and against a dishonest use of those tools from the political elites. Very similar examples of bad use can be found regarding the mechanisms of representative democracy, without being an argument against it.

Latin American and worldwide democrats have reasons to congratulate themselves for the advanced tools of direct democracy made available in some constitutions in the continent. We have to work towards the correction of the limitations affecting those tools at the moment (specially diminishing the number of signatures required in most of the cases to launch a direct democratic procedure) and to hope that political violence and the lack of responsibility of the political elites would not prevent that the germ of direct democracy planted in the last years will give an strong and healthy fruit.

^* to contact with the author of this document, please send a mail to jcgmadronal@yahoo.com

(1) Román D. Ortiz. Venezuela: una revolución en crisis , Cuadernos Hispanoamericanos, AECI, Madrid, March 2002

(3) Venezuela: referendum contra Chavez entra en semana crucial, El Caribe, 11 april 2004

(4) The main source consulted to prepare this table is the Direct Democracy DataBase, Centre D’etudes et de documentation sur la democratie directe, Universite de Geneve

(5) Oscar A. Bottinelli, Ocho actos electorales en cuatro años, El Observador, 21 December 1997

(6) Oscar A. Bottinelli, Plebiscitos y casualidades, El Observador, 25 August 2002