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The new EU constitution has sparked a lot of debate, but how does it fit in to the bigger picture of European integration? A recent report gives us some clues.

In April this year a little-known report was circulated on behalf of the European Commission. Entitled Building a Political Europe, the document explicitly sets out goals for a European political union that go far beyond even the proposed new constitution. A careful reading of the report tells us a lot about what the EU project is – and about the importance of the constitution. Far from being necessary to accommodate the new member states – as it happens, that is what we were told the Nice Treaty was meant to do – the constitution is yet another building block in the creation of a European state.

Most people believe that the original European Economic Community – the ‘Common Market’ – was a simple free trade area. In fact, it was designed to be something very different from a free trade area: a customs union. The distinction between a free trade area and a customs union is highly significant. A free trade area aims at reducing or abolishing tariffs and trade restrictions between members, but each member is free to negotiate their own arrangements with third countries. In other words, a free trade area does not infringe upon the sovereignty of its members. A customs union, by contrast, adopts a common external tariff and thus acts on behalf of member states. Typically, the proceeds of this external tariff are channelled into a common fund.

Political union: a long-held intention

So we see that, from the outset, the founders of the EEC were not concerned simply with reducing trade barriers, but with establishing common political institutions. In fact, the plans can be traced back at least to the 1930s and, more specifically, Altiero Spinelli’s plans in the 1940s for a United States of Europe. Interestingly, Spinelli later became a member of the European Parliament and introduced a draft constitution for Europe, but French president François Mitterand advised him that it would be easier to obtain his goals if they were introduced in ‘bite-size’ chunks – i.e., a step-by-step approach. This is the process that is happening before our eyes.

Since we joined the Common Market there have been continual steps in the direction of full political union, with no examples of treaties that have reversed the process. In 1979 the old European Assembly, composed of representatives from national parliaments, gave way to a European Parliament with directly elected representatives. The 1986 Single European Act, supposedly to help push through measures to free up trade, paved the way for a radical expansion of powers at the European level. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, signed in 1991, was claimed by the British government to be the ‘high tide’ of federalism. Unfortunately it simply fed the beast, introducing more new powers, creating a European citizenship and developing new EU roles in foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, likewise, increased the powers of the EU over nation states. And, as we have already mentioned, the Nice Treaty – another expansion of powers – was supposedly intended to make the EU’s decision-making procedures able to cope with enlargement. So what is the new constitution for?

Where the constitution fits in

To understand the new constitution, we must see that it is part of a process, a process that is never openly discussed by our political leaders. Consider, for example, the following extract from the recent report on Building a Political Europe:

The words [“A path towards political union”] were Robert Schuman's in his celebrated declaration of 9 May 1950: Building Europe through “concrete achievements”, the edifice built by the “Monnet method” [i.e., Jean Monnet, one of the early proponents of European union], the one which made possible such extraordinary progress through the ECSC [European Coal and Steel Community], the EEC and Euratom – all this was no more than “a first step in the federation of Europe”.

The time has now come to take the second step: that of the march towards political union. Something fundamentally new, this stage is the cross-over from yesterday’s Europe to tomorrow’s Europe. From what was principally an economic Europe to a Europe which must promote all its cherished values. From an elitist Europe to a more democratic Europe. From a Europe which says little about its ultimate goal to a Europe which proudly proclaims its political nature.

This political union is a long-term “ideal”. Because it too will not be created at a stroke, nor as a single edifice. Here too the “Monnet method” is still relevant. As demonstrated by the draft Constitutional Treaty, there will be no “revolutionary leap” to a political Europe: It will be built by small reforming steps, occasionally frustrating, frequently exhilarating, but never pointless.

The authors go on to describe the new constitution as the first stage in this drive towards full political union, to be followed by further stages in the creation of a fully-functioning European super-state.

We have only recently learned that the prime minister who took us into the EEC, Ted Heath, hoped for and expected a full political and defence union to be created. We are told in newly released papers that he thought that issue of Gibraltar’s sovereignty would no longer present a problem with Spain because, with Spain’s accession to the EEC, he expected national sovereignty to pass to the new European political and defence union. This is the prime minister who assured us that there would be ‘no essential loss of sovereignty’ in joining the EEC.

But what of the constitution itself? Even without conceding the plans of the euro-fanatics, the constitution is a significant step towards full political union. Even now, before the adoption of the constitution, the EU accounts for around 70% of our new laws. The constitution would strengthen this stranglehold on our affairs and substantially limit our power to act as a nation. Even before the ink on the constitution is dry, new common policies are being devised – significantly in defence, with technological and procurement programmes that will mean our ability to act without the authority of the EU in the future will be severely limited.

A quick guide to the implications of the new constitution

The constitution will take European integration – loss of national sovereignty – further than ever before:

1. The European Union has most of the trappings of a state already, but the constitution will take this further.

It is said that the EU is not a state, but under the new constitution it will embody all of the elements of a state – a President, a Foreign Minister, a Parliament, a supreme court, a civil service, a council of ministers, a flag, an anthem, a 'legal personality', citizenship, a bill of rights, a central bank and diplomatic missions overseas. It will have primacy over national constitutions and laws in a vast range of areas.

2. The EU constitution prescribes objectives that are political in character but enforceable by legal and bureaucratic means.

Member States are obliged to follow the principle of ‘loyal co-operation’ and must not carry out any measure contrary to the objectives of the Union. This is an important clause, since it gives the EU’s institutions such as the European Commission and the European Court of Justice the power to enforce acceptance of measures which rightly should be matters of political debate. For example, here are just a few of the EU’s objectives:

3. The EU would have primacy over national constitutions and national laws in most significant areas of policy.

EU 'law' would have primacy over national laws in trade policy, the customs union, monetary policy (for members of the euro), fisheries and marine conservation, co-ordination of economic and employment policies, foreign and security policy, defence policy, the internal market, the ‘area of freedom, security and justice' (i.e., most things), agriculture, transport, energy, aspects of social policy, 'economic, social and territorial cohesion', the environment, consumer protection and safety and public health issues. The EU would also have the power to initiate policies on research, technological development, space, industry, education, vocational training, culture, youth, sport, civil protection, development co-operation and humanitarian aid.

4. The national veto offers no protection of sovereignty.

The fig leaf offered by the UK government to gain our acceptance is that a ‘national veto’ will be maintained in a number of areas, including foreign and security policy. But the national veto is insufficient for several reasons. First, if one government signs up to a policy, that cannot be undone at a later stage – except by agreement of all 25 Member States. It breaches the fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy, namely that no parliament can bind its successors. Second, the national veto does us no good in seeking to change those elements of the EU which we already find disagreeable, such as the Common Agricultural Policy. The French have been able to stall serious reform of the CAP for years by threatening a veto. Thus reform can only come about by bargaining, elevating pork-barrel politics to a constitutional principle. Third, a policy-making process based on unanimity inevitably leads to suffocating inertia, limiting independent action and initiative. Fourth, we will already have signed up to the EU’s objectives (including ‘peace’, ‘solidarity among Member States’ and ‘strict observance of international law’), meaning that a large part of foreign policy will increasingly be seen as interpreting the EU’s pre-ordained objectives, allowing other Member States to block initiatives that we might otherwise take. Finally, the EU will have a new high profile President of the Council and EU Foreign Minister who will effectively become the spokesmen for the EU view, pre-empting national decision-making. The only system of decision-making in which national sovereignty can be preserved is one in which individual nation states have the right to opt in or out of specific programmes. This is not on offer.

5. Not all ‘myths’ are so wide of the mark.

The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and even the BBC have all highlighted so-called ‘myths’ about the EU put about by euro-sceptics, and they usually pick the more outlandish ones (such as a requirement to drive on the right). These are easy targets, but some of the supposed myths have more than a grain of truth about them. For example, once ‘myth’ widely mocked, including by the BBC, is that the UK would lose its seat on the UN Security Council. Needless to say, this is not true; but the truth is even more bizarre. EU Member States on the UN Security Council and other international bodies would be required at all times to follow the EU’s objectives and foreign policy. In the case of the UN Security Council, Member States such as the UK and France would be obliged, where there is an agreed EU policy position, to request that the EU Foreign Minister speaks to the Security Council on their behalf.

6. The EU gives us, in effect, a permanent coalition government

The EU is a permanent coalition government with no accountability to national electorates. We have seen in many countries with coalition governments how the results of elections produce a period of horse-trading as a coalition is formed. Third or fourth parties can exercise a decisive influence on power even though they are minorities. This leads to a sclerotic political process and frequently leaves the public feeling disenfranchised. This is multiplied many times in the EU. Electorates who reject their national governments will find that, increasingly, legislation is determined by the EU – an institution protected from the normal democratic pressures, with overlapping bureaucracies and parties divided on national as well as political lines.

7. The EU is a state but not a nation; it cannot be democratic.

The EU is a state but not a nation; that is, it has all of the elements of a state but not the national political culture that is necessary to foster and uphold democracy. It is easy to create artificial states but unfortunately nations can only evolve over centuries. This gives the key to the final illusion of the euro-fanatics: the idea that we can somehow create a ‘democratic Europe’. Democracy rests upon a shared national culture and usually a common language. Where a culture is divided – as in Northern Ireland – the presence of apparently democratic institutions do not in themselves deliver democracy. A clear case of this, ironically, is Belgium, which has Flemish-speaking parties and French-speaking parties. We should be wary of experiments that suppress nationhood while promising to maintain 'national identity'. After all, Wales has a distinct 'identity' but has not governed itself for most of the period since 1282 – unless we count the Welsh Assembly established in 1999.

Is that the future of the UK: a facade of self-government while the real power is systematically stripped away?