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BUILDING A POLITICAL EUROPE 50 proposals for tomorrow’s Europe Dominique Strauss-Kahn "A sustainable project for tomorrow’s Europe" formed on the initiative of the President of the European Commission Rapporteur This Report does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Commission Paris, 25 April 2004. Dear Romano, The European Union has reached a turning point in its history. It is facing a threefold crisis. Its institutions are functioning badly: they are threatened with paralysis and challenged on the grounds of their democratic deficit. Its project has run out of steam: today, no satisfactory answers are being offered to the questions of why we need Europe and where it is going. Its geographical scope is uncertain: for the first time, the Union is really having to ask itself where its ultimate boundaries lie. Despite all the talk of doom and gloom, however, this crisis, though fraught with threats, does not signal the death of the Union. There is no call for pessimism about its future. On the contrary, the fact that the current crisis is the result of an unprecedented acceleration in the construction of Europe is a guarantee that the European project will not die. If we pause to reflect a little, how can we be surprised that the Union's institutions are seizing up when, in under ten years, it will have seen its membership rise from twelve to fifteen and then to twenty-five? How can we fail to see that the pressing need for a new joint project is owing precisely to the success of the previous projects - the single market and the euro? Finally, how can we fail to recognise that if the problem of the Union's borders has become a matter of urgency this is due to the reunification of the European continent as a result of the accession of ten States from central and eastern Europe on 1 May 2004? The Union has the will to overcome this threefold crisis (of institutions, project and geographical scope). Thanks to the Convention, we now have a Draft Constitution for Europe. Despite the failure of the Brussels European Council on 13 December 2003 to reach agreement, this text has already gained broad support from the Heads of State and Government in the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). Although consensus has yet to be reached on a few points, it should be possible to arrive at an agreement at the European Council on 18 June. In addition to the adoption of a Constitution for the Union, the European project is once again being debated. As President of the Commission, you formed a Round Table on "A sustainable project for tomorrow's Europe" which I have had the honour of chairing. The challenge facing it was simple. Various ideas or ideals have inspired the building of Europe, the most recent of which was the euro; what should be the next such European idea or ideal? Since this reflection on the European project is inextricably linked to the geographical scope of this project, the report also addresses the question of the Union's borders. This matter is urgent: it must be settled before December 2004, when the European Heads of State and Government have agreed to give a definitive answer to Turkey's application for EU membership. The composition of the Round Table reflected the desire to represent the full geographic, political and human diversity of Europe. Its members are eminent figures from political and academic spheres and civil society: Isabel Aguilera, Magda Alvoet, Dora Bakoyannis, Tito Boeri, Bronislaw Geremek, Nicole Notat, Alojz Peterle, Karl-Henrik Robert, José Saramago, Hans Tietmayer and Lord Simon. The Round Table met in plenary session on seven occasions between January 2003 and April 2004. It held numerous hearings, and had guest speakers of the calibre of Jürgen Habermas and Amartya Sen. It received a great many written contributions. It had invaluable support from its rapporteur, Olivier Ferrand, and from the Commission President’s Group of Policy Advisers (GOPA), headed by Ricardo Franco Levi, and invaluable assistance from, among others, Elena Saraceno and Peter M. Smith. This report is the result of these activities. Many of the matters addressed by the Round Table have given rise to lively exchanges or even to the expression of largely irreconcilable views. I am submitting the report in my name, but in preparing it I have endeavoured to convey the spirit of our debate and to reflect most of the ideas that were discussed. Not all aspects of the proposals contained in this report are necessarily supported by all the members of the Round Table, and some may be an expression of my personal views; but the report as a whole reflects the way our debate developed. What is the most appropriate project and geographical scope for the Europe of tomorrow? These are the questions to which, through the round table debate, I have endeavoured to provide some answers. Dominique Strauss-Kahn ROUND TABLE "A SUSTAINABLE PROJECT FOR TOMORROW’S EUROPE" --- Members Chair: Members: Magda AELVOET (Belgium) former
minister of the environment Rapporteur: ------------ CONTENTS
UMMARY OF THE REPORT --- 0. High ambitions for the next twenty years: build a political Europe. Hitherto, the European Union has been built on foundations which people considered essentially technical. At the end of the Second World War, the European federalist movement had hopes of building a supranational political Europe from scratch; these hopes foundered on the reality of nationalist tendencies that were still strong at the time, leading to the failure of the "States General of Europe" in The Hague in 1948 and then the shelving of the planned European Defence Community in 1954. The ingenuity of the "founding fathers" broke the political deadlock by making a start, via the creation of what were to be the forerunners (ECSC, EEC and Euratom) 2 of the present European Union, on building a supranational Europe presented as very much a technical edifice — this is what was known as the "Monnet method":
The question of a further move towards a political Europe arises again today. First of all, because the Union has gradually extended its areas of competence (agriculture, VAT harmonisation, internal market, euro, etc.) and has thus assumed growing political weight. Then, because the expectations of the Union are now clearly political: economic prosperity, through completion of the internal market via the euro; progress in social matters (with the "social agenda") and on the environment (with the "strategy of sustainable development"); police and justice (within the justice and home affairs pillar); diplomacy and defence (with the European security and defence policy). The question of the ultimate purpose of the European venture is therefore facing us again: should the Union return to the long-term political vision of the founding fathers, who regarded the "concrete achievements" as a "first step in the federation of Europe" 5 ? Or should it continue along the path on which it has embarked and propose no more than a framework for ever-closer cooperation between independent States?
1. A political Europe is legitimate because Europeans have a shared model of society. 1.1. A political Europe is legitimate only if it is the expression of an identity, collective values and a model of society: it is not an end in itself. 1.2. This European model of society exists. Its roots are to be found in the history of the European continent, which has had times of imperial unity (Greek civilisation, Roman Empire, Charlemagne, Charles V, Napoleon) and cultural unity (Christianity in the Middle Ages, the Republic of Letters). The origins can also be found in the violence of the divisions of Europe, in particular the horror of the Second World War, which brought European civilisation to the brink of annihilation: the refusal of such divisions fed its unceasing quest for unity. The European model has taken on new dimensions with the Community edifice, which has produced ever-closer "de facto solidarity"6. 1.3. What is the substance of this European model of society? The European model is a reflection of the wish to found a world of justice based on the indivisibility of human dignity. As such, it has four components.
It is by promoting multilateralism that Europe proposes on the world stage the model of justice it has developed for itself; the vision of the international order which this reflects is one that refuses power in favour of the law, priority to peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiations and arbitration, and solidarity with poor countries.
1.4. A political Europe as the vector of this European model is legitimate. It is legitimate because the model is specific to Europe. It would be nonsense, of course, to imagine that the concept of human dignity and the values attached to it are exclusively European. But the way it is expressed — its indivisible nature — is unparalleled elsewhere. It is also legitimate because Europeans are proud of their model: in the Fifteen and in the new Member States alike, all polls show that Europeans are attached to the European model. And finally, it is legitimate because the European model is forward-looking. It is not the symbol of an "old Europe" left behind by the successes of the United States, the dynamisms of China or the emergence of India. The European model of justice is universal, heralding tomorrow's world, a promise of a new "new world": a world where reason of State has given way to the primacy of human rights, a world which prefers sustainable development to productivist growth, a world which has broken with traditional power and turned to peace and the rule of law. 2. A political Europe is not only legitimate, it is also necessary to defend the European model which is under threat. 2.1. The continued existence of the European model is not guaranteed, as it is going through a very deep crisis. The engine of the model, growth, has stalled: alongside Russia, the Union is the area of the world with the lowest growth rate. The inequalities produced by market forces are increasing; the welfare state is proving less and less capable of correcting them, both because of financing difficulties and because it is accused of undermining Europe's economic competitiveness. Environmental protection is likewise under threat because of the rising costs involved. The multilateralism advocated by Europe is giving way to the return of power politics. Europe's cultural identity is faltering: instead of progressing, European values are on the decline, and democratic values — eroded by low election turnouts, votes for extremist parties and the tarnished image of politicians — are those suffering most. 2.2. The crisis of the European model is primarily endogenous: the model is being eroded from within. A combination of five factors can account for this.
2.3. The European model is also threatened from without:
2.4. As there is no political embodiment of the European model by the European Union, the model is not properly defended. The Union does not have the political powers required to support this model. Its powers are limited essentially to economic matters: an economic Europe exists, but not a political one. It is true that outside the economic field Europe has been entrusted with an increasing number of political objectives (social and environmental policies, diplomacy and defence, police and justice), but the powers for achieving these objectives have not been given to the European Union: the social agenda, the sustainable development strategy, the JHA pillar and ESDP are still matters for intergovernmental cooperation in the hands of the Member States. Even in the economic field, the Union has not been provided with the legal and financial powers it needs to attain the new objectives it has been set: economic governance of the euro zone is wanting, as there is no European budgetary authority; the changeover to an innovation strategy launched in Lisbon has remained a dead letter as the instruments for implementing this strategy are not available. New political powers based on the "Community method" are required today to enable the Union to embody the European model. But it is inconceivable today that such powers will be transferred as the people will not give their consent, on the grounds that the Union lacks political legitimacy. A start was made in providing the European institutions with a political base: greater political accountability for the Commission, the rise of the European Parliament to become a fully fledged legislative body, creation of the European Council. But the original paradox still exists: while the Commission holds most of the European executive power, it is not the Union's political government. No further progress can be made in securing new powers without making good this democratic deficit: for instance, how could a European defence possibly be established if the Union does not have full political accountability? The new political ideal for the Union: building a political Europe. 3.1. Building a political Europe means first and
foremost giving the Union a political project: giving life to Europeans' model,
building a world of justice. Article 3 of the draft European Constitution says
as much: "The Union's aim is to promote … its values". This remedial model is now over-stretched: financing constraints, new social demands for equality, growing irreversibility of environmental damage, need to free the South. For this reason, the European model of justice now has to do more than simply correct the unwanted effects caused by society, it must stop them arising: it must attack problems at the root, prevent rather than cure, concentrate on opportunities as well as protection. The report suggests the following ideas to build this new model of justice based on opportunities:
Economic Europe, environmental Europe, social Europe, external policy: hitherto, the Union's powers have been sectoral, but the report proposes that they should be made general. So that this does not result in the gradual disappearance of national powers, a new definition of subsidiarity is required. It is suggested that it be based on three principles: the principle of responsibilities; the principle of respect for historical precedence; the principle of effectiveness. 3.2 Building a political Europe also means giving the Union a political arm. If it is to manage a general political project, the Union must be given full political legitimacy. Three dimensions are involved:
3.3 Building a political Europe means finally
giving the Union a political territory. But the question of the organisation of the Union must also be answered. Not all the Member States will be able, or willing, to progress at the same pace towards political union; creation of a more integrated political core could then be seen as an appropriate solution. Similarly, creating a group that is less integrated but enjoying real solidarity with the Union in economic, financial and social matters would bring a wide area within the Union's sphere of influence. In conclusion, this "ideal" for the Europe of tomorrow will not be achieved in a day; it will take at least twenty years. To get there, a course must be charted to a political Europe. The first step must be that of adopting the constitutional treaty. The second concerns the financial perspective, which must be seen as an opportunity to redirect Union policies towards its model of society and provide it with commensurate budget resources. Then the way in which the Union operates under the first European Constitution from 2007 onwards will allow policies to be consolidated. The difficulties of giving life to the European model will quickly become apparent. This will lead to a new constitutional step leading ultimately to completion of the political Europe. UMMARY50 PROPOSALS FOR BUILDING A POLITICAL EUROPE Strand I: Invest in knowledge, focusing on research and higher education Strand II: Develop an industrial policy for Europe Strand III: Revitalise the single market Strand IV: Reform the Union’s macroeconomic framework Strand V: Integrate an environmental prevention principle into the European model Strand VI: Give the Union a Community environmental policy Strand VII: Implement a European social policy aimed at ensuring genuine equality of opportunity so as to promote equality of destiny Strand VIII: Create welfare protection for European citizens Strand IX: Strengthen solidarity between European countries Strand X: Develop Europe as a power at the service of multilateralism Strand XI: developing a genuine European policy of co-development Strand XII: create a common immigration policy Proposal 31: make management of immigration a responsibility of the European Union. European immigration policy would be based on three pillars: (i) managing legal immigration on the basis of a quota system; (ii) aiding development by encouraging temporary immigration schemes; (iii) combating illegal immigration through a European border police force.Strand XIII: towards budgetary federalism Strand XIV: redefining the principles of subsidiarity Strand XV: assign the task of preparing a new constitutional phase to the next European Parliament Strand XVI: helping to give life to a European democratic area Strand XVII: reinforcing the feeling of belonging to the Union Proposal 46: support the European museum project. Strand XVIII: define the territories of the Union This report is being published at a critical time for Europe. Admittedly, throughout the history of the construction of Europe the spectre of a crisis has often been raised in order to dramatise the issues at stake as a means of ensuring that the European project remains on course. But this time the crisis cannot be ignored. It can be summarised in a single sentence: the European Union is no longer delivering what its citizens expect of it. In the past the construction of European has amply fulfilled the hopes of its founders. Its main success is to have created the conditions for a definitive peace between the European nations and, in particular, to have consolidated Franco-German reconciliation; born in the wake of the war, it has forged such close bonds between its members that an armed conflict between them has become unimaginable. Its other main success is economic: the unification of the European economic area has made it possible to reinforce Europe’s potential for growth, enabling it in a few decades to catch up with the United States in terms of development. However, the European Union no longer fulfils the hopes that were placed in it. Setting aside peace in Europe, which is still the cornerstone of the Union, none of the four promises that were made to European citizens have been kept. Firstly, prosperity. The hope was that by completing the common market, the euro would bring growth and employment. Yet Europe is mired in weak growth and high unemployment; it is lagging behind in the world economy and the gap with the United States is once again widening rapidly. Secondly, social and environmental progress. Although the Union has action programmes in these areas, which were defined at the European Councils of Lisbon (2000) and Gothenburg (2001), the limited progress actually made since then intensifies the feeling of many Europeans that we are witnessing a regression caused by an economic globalisation in which the Union is a Trojan horse. Thirdly, security. This is the objective of the "justice and home affairs" (JHA) pillar that was added to the Union by the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty). But here again the results have been disappointing. Fourthly, the promise that Europeans would once again have a say on the international scene. This promise has been kept as far as trade is concerned, since the Union wields power in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), but has become a dead letter in financial and strategic terms. Although the Union has set itself diplomatic and military objectives that are reflected in the European security and defence policy (ESDP), its incapacity to carry weight in world affairs is all too evident from its lack of influence in the past in the former Yugoslavia and today in Iraq and the Middle East. Why is the European Union no longer keeping its promises? One very good reason is that it has been assigned new tasks but still lacks the powers required to carry them out. It is ineffective because it is powerless. The Union’s powers are primarily economic. Since the Treaty of Paris (18 April 1951), establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and the Treaties of Rome (25 March 1957), establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), Europe has been built through progressive transfers of economic powers: coal and steel production, nuclear power production, customs duties, trade policy, the agricultural policy, competition policy, the harmonisation of VAT, the internal market rules, and finally the euro. The powers transferred are exercised by the "Community method", designed to ensure that effective action can be taken by it. Executive power is entrusted to a supranational institution, the Commission, which is the watchdog of the general European interest; legislative power is shared by two chambers, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, which make decisions by majority rather than requiring the support of all 7. The Union’s non-economic objectives (social and environmental progress, ESDP, JHA) do not form part of the Community’s areas of competence 8: while it is true that negotiations are conducted within the Union, they are intergovernmental, in other words any decisions have to be unanimous. This has paralysed decision-making in a Union of fifteen members and will do so even more in an enlarged Union. 7 The two institutions use different procedures – qualified majority in the Council of Ministers and simple majority in the European Parliament.8 "Community" powers are powers assigned to the Union under a transfer of sovereignty to the Union as part of the "Community method". This lack of legal and financial power applies equally to the new economic tasks entrusted to the Union. The euro created a unified monetary area, but the lack of a single budgetary authority means that the macroeconomic control of this area is not guaranteed. With the "Lisbon strategy" 9, the Union set itself the target of becoming the most competitive economy by 2010 by stepping up investment in knowledge, innovation and research, but this new objective has been accompanied neither by the Community instruments needed to achieve it nor by an adequate budget. The Lisbon strategy is toothless. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that it remains mere wishful thinking. 9 Action programme adopted by the Lisbon European Council. It might be supposed that to make the Union effective all that is needed is to transfer to the Community the powers it requires to meet its objectives. But this simply cannot be contemplated as things stand. The citizens of the Member States are not prepared to consent to such a transfer of powers because they do not consider that the Union’s institutions have sufficient political legitimacy. Hitherto, public opinion has viewed the process of European construction primarily a technical affair. This is because of the method of integration adopted by the first architects of the European communities. The initial attempt of Europe's "founding fathers" to bring about political union after World War II through the proposed European Defence Community (EDC) ended in failure. In order to accommodate the nationalism of the Member States, they therefore fell back on the "Monnet method" of building Europe through concrete achievements. These were the sectoral economic powers, which although not devoid of political content were often associated with transfers to the Union of technical powers (e.g. customs duties). In the future, however, the challenge faced by European construction will be essentially a political one. This shift is the result of a gradual evolution. As the Union's economic scope of action became more extensive, the powers transferred to it by the Member States increasingly involved the exercise of sovereignty. Thus, the adoption of the single currency signalled the replacement of the national exercise of monetary sovereignty with a sovereignty shared among the members of the euro zone. However, the nature of the Union’s policies in recent years has changed things. From now on, whether the issues at stake relate to social or environmental policy, justice, the police, diplomacy or defence, the Union will have to be given overall political, rather than sectoral, powers. The nature of the supranational institutions created when the foundation stones of Europe were first laid (the High Authority for the ECSC and the Commission for the EEC and Euratom) was determined by the technical powers entrusted to them. These institutions therefore lacked an explicitly political vocation. Over the years, however, partly due to the creation of the European Parliament and the increasingly important role played by it, they have become progressively politicised. Yet citizens still consider that the European institutional system lacks political legitimacy and deplore the "democratic deficit". It therefore seems unrealistic to seek to define new powers before responding to this call for increased democracy. The question of the political legitimacy of the European institutions is at the heart of the current Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). It was one of the main issues addressed in the draft treaty drawn up by the Convention on the future of Europe, which served as a basis for the negotiations in the IGC. It aims to give Europe a Constitution that will enshrine the rights of European citizens and create an eminently political institutional system. It thus contains the seeds of the "European republic" 10, but this is only the first step in the construction of Europe as a political union. 10 In the sense of res publica. In this sense all the Member States of the Union, including the monarchies, are republican systems. Likewise, with the Nihil Novi constitution from 1505 to 1795, Poland was a republican monarchy. Building this political Europe, and having a clear idea of why we are doing so, is the challenge facing the European project today. The "Monnet method" allowed the construction of Europe to be undertaken without explicit agreement as to its purpose. But with more and more powers being transferred to the Community, the question arises of how they are to be administered by a political government and forces Europeans to clarify the objective of this shared adventure. It is no longer possible to create the European Union without defining the sort of union we intend to create. * * What do we want to do with our other partners in this joint venture? What should be our common goal, our shared ideal? Should we preserve the union as an area of law in which the interests of largely interdependent nations converge, or advance towards a federal Union? Should we confine ourselves to organising a huge economic market, or develop a Europe that will extend into the numerous spheres that govern our societies? These questions lead us to the question of the legitimacy of a political Union. Is it legitimate for the Union rather than the Member States to be entrusted with achieving a large part of our common objectives and to deal with matters of social and environmental policy, justice, the police, diplomacy, defence and research? The Round Table considers that only the existence of European values, making up a model of European society, can justify the transition to a political union and the definition and implementation of many of our specific policies by the European institutions. The Round Table would stress that such a community of values does exist, as the basis of a model of society founded on the indivisibility of human dignity. Europeans are proud of this model and want to set an example by promoting a just world (see Part One). Europe as a political union is therefore legitimate, but more than that, it has become necessary. The European model is threatened with disappearance. It is being eroded from within and attacked from without. Its continuity is not guaranteed because it is not being defended. It is therefore a matter of urgency for this model to be embodied in a political union (see Part Two). That is why we must commit ourselves to building a political union. This will require, first of all, a new project for the Union. It must first be given the necessary policies and powers to enable it to embody the model of European society, and then full political legitimacy through the strengthening of European democracy. This requires not only the politicisation of the institutions, but also the development of a political arena and the emergence of the European people. Finally, the Union’s boundaries must be set. A political Europe needs a clearly-defined territory (see Part Three). The construction of this political union will be a long-term project that will take several decades. It will not be built in a day but by progressive advances and successive phases (see Conclusion). The Round Table therefore believes that if we are to defend and renew our model of society and enable it to set an example to the world, the time has come for a political union. This is the new European ideal that should inspire us and the new horizon for the Europe of tomorrow: to build a political Europe as a foundation for a world of justice. PART ONE --- A political Europe is legitimate: The question of whether it is necessary to move to a political Europe, and for what reasons it might be desirable to do so, was at the heart of the Round Table’s work. This Report consistently advocates the establishment of a political Europe. It is a requirement justified by a clear European identity inherited from history, a real community of values and the development of solidarity, which ultimately shape a shared model of society. 1.1. Only the existence of a shared model of society can legitimise a political Europe. The goal of a political Europe based on real shared values and aspirations has not yet received unanimous support, either from public opinion or from political leaders. A view widely held today questions the existence of a European community of values. Many people believe that Europe is split into as many communities of values as nation states, if not more. While some European peoples have learnt to respect each other, to cooperate within a network of interdependencies, to live together, there is no single European people, according to this view. Given this fact, two opposing theories emerge in the search for the foundations of a political Europe: one which none the less maintains that a "community of values" exists and one which attempts to move away from it towards a "community based on the rule of law". 1.1.1. Citizenship without values: the limits of the "community based on the rule of law" Supporters of the "community based on the rule of law" theory argue that a political Europe is possible, even if not backed up by a community of values. Some even go so far as to assert that a political Europe is feasible only if it dispenses with any basis in values.11 For them, there could be such a thing as European citizenship even without a European identity founded on values, since citizenship refers to a "community based on the rule of law", something which can be conceived of independently of values: the citizen is a member of a political community and as such enjoys a set of civil and political rights. According to this viewpoint, citizenship is a deliberate construction: for European citizenship to come into being, all that is needed is the will to create it on the basis of a constitution and shared institutions. This view corresponds to a purely "republican" understanding of European political reality as a deliberate and artificial construction. 11 This is the stance taken, for example, by the German philosopher Robert Spaemann: "The Europe of the future can become a community based on the rule of law where all citizens of countries with a European tradition find a common home only when it enables communities sharing value judgments to exist in security and when it renounces the aim of becoming a community of values itself" (Europa - Wertegemeinschaft oder Rechtsordnung? in Transit 21, Summer 2001). It is true that, in the course of its history, Europe has seen a number of unifications based on law, which established forms of "communities based on the rule of law" while preserving ethnic differences and local identities. The imperial unifications in particular, from the western Roman empire to the Holy Roman Empire and the Napoleonic empire, imposed legal orders on Europe which did not involve or impose any community of values. The empire’s subjects had to obey its laws and meet their tax obligations; for the rest, they were free to keep their community’s specific values and act in accordance with them. The Round Table rejects this "republican" perception of European political reality. It disputes the link between the "legal orders" imposed by the empires and what should be the political reality of tomorrow’s Europe. The "imperial laws" were imposed, whereas the political integration of the European Union must be based on a legal order that is chosen. Moreover, the Round Table takes the view that this purely volitional and artificial perception of a political Union would turn Europe into an abstract concept with no sense of belonging. It would distance public opinion still further from the European integration project. Moreover, the desire to create this sort of European "republic" may well fade. A political union built on such abstract foundations without any relationship to values would not easily obtain the support of the European public. It would inevitably end in deadlock: how could national citizens back a process of creating European citizenship without knowing why the process was taking place? If there is to be a desire for Europe, the sense of belonging to Europe must be strong; it must take the form of some sort of shared destiny. Without such a shared destiny, minority groups cannot accept the rule of the majority; however, democracy means just that, which requires a certain degree of trust among citizens, a trust based on the sense of collective belonging. Imposing laws independently of any shared values was sometimes possible in the past, but in undemocratic systems. This fact cannot serve as a model for tomorrow’s Europe, whose democratic culture is one of its key features. 1.1.2. The need for a community of values The Round Table feels that the future of the Union is inextricably linked to the existence of a European community of values: only such values can legitimise the rise of a political Europe with general supra-national powers and political institutions set up to embody them. The community of values links individuals who share a sufficiently strong sense of belonging to allow them to live side-by-side, organise interdependent systems and accept the decisions made by the majority. It reflects the existence of an emerging people and of a "spiritual principle" underlying the emerging nation. 12 This "shared soul" is at the basis of a shared model of society and heralds the desire for a common destiny. If such a "shared soul" does not exist, there is no justification for shaping a political Europe: in this case the Union must confine itself to being an area of law. If, on the other hand, it is12 The concept of European "nation" would not reflect the ethnic view of the nation (as developed by Fichte): there is no such uniform identity in Europe, nor will there be in the foreseeable future. If the European "nation" exists, it is a reflection of the spiritual concept put forward by Ernest Renan, which strips the nation of its material foundations - race, language, religion, common interests, geography: "Two things which in truth are but one, make up this soul, this spiritual principle. One lies in the past, the other in the present. One is the joint possession of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form." (Qu’est-ce qu’une nation ? – 1882) This community of values is not yet fully formed: like the sense of national belonging, which is a gradual process, feeling European is a sense which is under construction. The community will be consolidated by the creation of a political Europe, and will become the common property of the emerging European people. In this way, a political Europe and European identity each stimulate the growth of the other. But the principle is clear: there can be no political Europe without a European community of values; a political Europe cannot be created unless a European people emerges. 1.2. The European model exists; it is rooted in Europe’s history. 1.2.1. The European community of values has deep historical roots. Imperial values Europe’s history has been moulded by the ebbs and flows of continental empires. The empires of Europe were not only legal orders;13 they also served as a vehicle for unifying values. This is particularly true of the ancient empires. The term "Europe" was coined to describe the part of the world over which the Greek civilisation had spread: it denoted "the area west of the Hellespont", "the Occident", as opposed to the Orient, or Persia.14 Characterised by a City founded on rules defined by men, and no longer on the principle of a natural order, Athenian democracy extended well beyond its borders. With the Roman Empire, the whole of Europe was progressively brought together by unifying values: the Latin language, the Christian religion, the economic and cultural exchanges fostered by the establishment of a dense network of land links. 15 13 See part 1.1.1. above. Even in the case of more recent legal orders, the European empires did not impose legal structures alone; they also helped to unify values across their territory. This unification was achieved directly, through teaching - as with the example of Charlemagne, who created a palace school at Aix-la-Chapelle to equip the empire with scholars - or through religion - again through the efforts of Charlemagne, with the process of Christianisation acting as the cement that held his empire together. The unification procedure was also indirect: within the Carolingian Empire, the balance between the spiritual power of the Pope and the temporal power of the Emperor thus provided optimum conditions for the subsequent development of religious tolerance, freedom of conscience and secularism. Likewise, the diffusion of the Napoleonic Code, by tackling such identity-laden matters as family or property, was a significant factor in unification. Cultural legacies Besides these imperial experiences, Europe has experienced other times of cultural unity, twice establishing a historic community of shared values in the past: medieval Christianity and later the Republic of Letters. In the 13th century, despite the absence of political unity, Europe was unified by the Christian faith. It was organised around a centre of power, Rome, where St. Peter’s successors had their seat. It was centred around a network of churches, constructed in the same Roman, then Gothic, architectural style, using the same calendar and the same liturgy, and developing pilgrimage routes criss-crossing Europe. Cultural unity was notably shaped by the network of universities linking the European elites: from Krakow to Leuven, from the Sorbonne to Salamanca, the same corpus was taught (greatly inspired by Aristotelianism), the same teaching methods were used (essay, open debate), the same disciplines were practised (logic, rhetoric, etc.), the same language - Latin - was used, and the degrees were recognised throughout Europe: the licentia ubique docendi. Christianity was therefore European by vocation, as Pope Enea Silvio Piccolomini (Pius II) was to declare.16 The second unification movement in Europe’s history was the Republic of Letters, from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment, an extraordinary movement of artistic, literary and scientific unification. This movement was a rediscovery of classic antiquity, based on a new faith, humanism, with a credo rooted in scientific progress, the force of reason, openness to the world and government of men. This unification was facilitated by improvements in means of distributing ideas, kick-started by the printing revolution, which allowed a European cultural base to be established.17 It also benefited from the travelling culture, the life of Erasmus 18 being a prime example, bringing together people from all over the continent. Thus, the expression "we Europeans" flowed more naturally from the pen of the citizens of the Republic of Letters. Did Montesquieu not say "Europe is just one nation made up of many"?19 So, Europe has inherited from its history a "rich legacy" of common values 20 which, having originated in ancient times, has grown in step with successive European unification movements. 16 Europe: The Emergence of
an Idea (Denys Hay, 1957). Overcoming European conflicts Modern European identity has also been strengthened by its ability to withstand threats and overcome the conflicts that have torn it apart: it feeds not only on unified experiences from the past but also on division and European conflicts. It could even be maintained that periods of European unity are the results of overcoming earlier conflicts. Europe moves in successive cycles of this sort: firstly, the introduction of new progressive principles; then, crisis, division and rejection of these principles; finally, moving beyond this to the birth of a new model of civilisation. It is true for medieval Christianity, born from the chaos after the fall of the Roman Empire. It is true for the Republic of Letters: Erasmus bears witness to a spirit of peace that forms a counterpoint to the religious violence of the time. In each period of history, Europe has tried to formulate progressive principles. These principles are strengthened under the influence of the opposition and resistance they arouse. At any given moment, the new Europe, the embodiment of a progressive principle, comes up against an old Europe that is unwilling to break with the status quo. This "negative dialectic" between pioneering principles and the forces opposing them has shaped the European dynamic. Following the creation of the European Union, we have cleared yet another hurdle in the establishment of a European community of shared values. The explosion of nationalist movements in the 19th century, and the rise in the ideologies which produced the two major totalitarian movements in the 20th century, put an end to the Republic of Letters and led to the division of the European continent. The ambitions of hegemony that took hold of some nation states brought European civilisation very close to extinction, with the tragedy of Nazism, through the desire to give the German people "Lebensraum", representing the paroxysmal distortion of national sentiment. It was the tragic experiences of World War II, with its series of horrors - 50 million dead, extermination camps, the Holocaust and the Jewish genocide, the denial of humanity - that led to the latest step forward, which has been characterised since the start of the 1950s by the building of a Community. These rifts were necessary in order to firmly establish the idea that European civilisation would not mean domination of one national identity over the others, but rather, through these identities coming together, promotion of their diversity and mutual enrichment. 1.2.2. The European community of values has been reinforced through the building of the Community. The failure of previous attempts at political integration The historical emergence of a European community of values kept alive utopian ideals and, subsequently, projects for political integration in Europe. If these projects failed, it was mainly because Europeans’ sense of a shared identity was insufficiently strong: although there was a community of values, there was no emerging European nation to justify a political Europe. The first documented plan for a European confederation, responding to the desire to establish lasting peace between the nations of Europe, was proposed in 1463 to Louis XI by the King of Bohemia, Georges Podiebrad; it consisted of creating a political assembly, a court of justice, a combined army and a federal budget. This first project for unifying the Christian world was succeeded by the "grand design", attributed to Henry IV by the Duke of Sully, 21 to organise a European Confederation of fifteen States placed under the protection of a Council of Europe. 21 In his Economies royales (1611). This federal inspiration cultivated the various "plans for perpetual peace" that blossomed in the 18th century, 22 proposing the organisation of European society founded on a pact of perpetual alliance between the monarchs. 2322 Immanuel Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden, published in 1795, is the most famous and the most complete among them, but it was not the first. A Mémoire pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe was published between 1713 and 1717 by the abbé de Saint-Pierre, while Rousseau produced a commentary on it in Jugement sur la paix perpétuelle.23 On the other hand, the project outlined in 1814 by Saint-Simon in De la réorganisation de la société européenne ou de la nécessité et des moyens de rassembler les peuples de l'Europe en un seul corps politique, en conservant à chacun son indépendance nationale was based on "common interests" and "solid commitments", such as setting up a general parliament invested with the power to settle disputes between the national governments, or large community projects such as a canal connecting the Rhine to the Danube. But as Saint-Simon indicated in the subtitle to his pamphlet, it was not a question of challenging "the independence" of the peoples of Europe or, more precisely, their sovereignty.Projects for a European federation were revived as a reaction against the rise of nationalist movements. It was Victor Hugo who, on 21 August 1849, at the French National Assembly, was the first to voice the idea of a "United States of Europe": "A day will come when war will seem as absurd and impossible between Paris and London, between Petersburg and Berlin, as it would seem impossible and absurd today between Rouen and Amiens, between Boston and Philadelphia. A day will come when you, France, you Russia, you Italy, you England, you Germany … you will be merged closely within a higher unit and you will form the European brotherhood". Projects then multiplied after the trauma of World War I. In 1923, Richard de Coudenhove-Kalergi founded the Pan-European Union, with the goal of uniting the peoples of continental Europe, allowing them to maintain an influence on an international stage dominated by the United States, the USSR and the Commonwealth. 2424 "Is it possible that on the little European peninsula, 25 States can live side by side in international anarchy, without this state of affairs leading to the most terrible political, economic and cultural catastrophe?… A divided Europe leads to war, oppression, poverty, while a united Europe leads to peace and prosperity." (Manifeste paneuropéen, extracts, 1923)Masaryk, the Czechoslovakian president, for a while considered taking on the project but abandoned the idea on account of the magnitude of the task. Aristide Briand, honorary president of the Pan-European Union and French Minister for Foreign Affairs, followed this up by suggesting before the League of Nations in September 1929 25 that a "kind of federal link" be instituted between the peoples of Europe. 2624 "Is it possible that on the little European peninsula, 25 States can live side by side in international anarchy, without this state of affairs leading to the most terrible political, economic and cultural catastrophe?… A divided Europe leads to war, oppression, poverty, while a united Europe leads to peace and prosperity." (Manifeste paneuropéen, extracts, 1923) 25 That is, one year after the signing of the Treaty of Paris on 27 August 1928, known as the "Briand-Kellogg pact", which sought to "outlaw" war. 26 This initiative was to come to nothing. The memorandum prepared by Alexis Léger, Secretary-General at the French Foreign Ministry, and presented in May 1930, anticipated the refusal of the European States to give up even the slightest portion of their sovereignty and simply put forward the idea of creating a European conference, which took the form of a moribund League of nations. It was the ravages of World War II that gave a decisive impetus to a federal Europe. As early as 1941, the Italian anti-fascist Altiero Spinelli wrote a Manifesto for a free and united Europe from his prison cell. In spring 1944, the European non-Communist resistance movements, meeting in Switzerland, followed this up by launching a joint call to "overcome the dogma of absolute State sovereignty" to create a "federal Union". Associations sprang up everywhere and merged in 1948 to give birth to the European Movement. Federalist think tanks took off and were formed into an International Coordination Committee, which took the initiative of organising a "Congress of Europe" in The Hague in May 1948. The conference in The Hague, which brought together 800 delegates - including 60 ministers and almost 200 members of parliament - raised high hopes. Winston Churchill, who had already called for the birth of the "United States of Europe" in 1946, 27 chaired it and recommended the creation of a political and economic Union, where certain sovereign rights would be shared and the national Parliaments would elect an association of delegates. In 1949, this huge project was to produce the first great post-war European achievement - the Council of Europe: although it failed to become the core of a political Europe, it nevertheless upheld Europe’s humanist values by becoming the guardian of the European Convention on Human Rights. 27 Without Britain or the Commonwealth. The attempts at political integration did not end with this failure. In March 1950, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer proposed the creation of a Franco-German union, with a common nationality and citizenship. The French government did not even study his proposal. The vicissitudes of the European Defence Community (EDC) illustrate the difficulty of taking the idea of a political Europe forward after World War II. Faced with the necessary remilitarisation of Germany in an international context turned upside down by the cold war, France, on Jean Monnet’s initiative, suggested integrating German forces into a European army, rather than leaving them under national control. Supported by the United States, the treaty establishing the EDC was signed in Paris in May 1952. It was accompanied by a plan for political union, backed by the Italian Prime Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, and the German, Heinrich von Brentano. Despite very keen American pressure, and even though the treaty of the EDC was ratified by all the other countries, France put an end to these projects on 30 August 1954: its Parliament rejected the EDC by 319 votes to 264. Building the Community: gradual integration made possible by the "Monnet method" During the immediate post-war period, in the absence of a pre-existing "European nation", political integration came up against resistance from the States and peoples of Europe. However, the reality of the shared values uniting them and the feeling of having come so close to an annihilation of their joint civilisation allowed progress to be made towards European unification. The first impetus came from the United States in 1947 with the Marshall plan: to force the Europeans to pull together, the American government decided to allocate an overall financial package to the western States of Europe, leaving it to them to come to an agreement on the assessment of needs and the distribution of the sums. A coordination structure was created in March 1948: the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). 28 28 Today the OECD. However, it was the approach launched by Jean Monnet that successfully overcame opposition to the construction of Europe: the key was to abandon the idea of attacking national identities head on by means of an overall federal structure, and instead start with more pragmatic, more specific, more progressive achievements. Creating a political Europe in the sense of a supranational federation with extensive policy-making powers was unrealistic in the immediate post-war period. As a "federal revolution" was not possible, the approach had to be reform in small stages. This was the beauty of the "Monnet method": building a federal Europe by means of a technical approach. In practice, this involved transferring sectoral and non-politically-sensitive national powers, such as those relating to customs duties, to a supra-national executive (the High Authority of the ECSC, the Commission of the EEC, the Commission of Euratom) and refraining from conferring direct democratic legitimacy on the European institutions so as to prevent their being rejected by the Member States. The "Monnet method", illustrated by the declaration made by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 — "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity" — enabled Europe to break through the political deadlock: it directed the creation of the ECSC in 1951, then the EEC and Euratom in 1957. A "stroke of genius" that allowed the consolidation of the European community of values and paved the way to a political Europe The successes of building a community have reinforced Europeans’ awareness of their common identity. De facto solidarity has increased, the European community of values thrived and the feeling of a common destiny has grown stronger. Through the extension and deepening of the sectoral policies accepted by their respective governments and implemented by the Community’s institutions, Europeans have lived together in a much more intense way than in the past: a new European reality has emerged from these shared experiences. Whether they live in Germany or Italy, in the United Kingdom or Portugal, and now in Poland or Malta, Europeans are thinking more and more as Europeans. Thus pragmatism prevailed where idealism had proved ineffectual, and determination triumphed where the force of imperial unifications, and power based solely on interests, had failed: the European Union of today was born from a strictly political desire, striding forward under cover of discreet pragmatism. The choice of achieving integration by means of successive strides forward, and the emphasis placed by the pioneers of European integration on the economic aspects of this integration, must not conceal the political nature of their project: through pragmatic means, they gave life to the European ideal driving them. From the declaration by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950, people especially remember the "de facto solidarity" that would result from "concrete achievements"; people often forget that the additional development expected from the linkage of the national economies would be only the "first step in the federation of Europe". 29 While the political objectives of European integration are not mentioned in the main body of the EEC treaty, they can be found in its preamble, which sets as its goal an "ever-closer union" in Europe.30 29 "The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims".30 "Determined to lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe, resolved by thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts …". The delegation of national powers relating to trade policy and competition policy to the European Commission back in 1957 illustrates the will of the EEC’s founders to give the institution that represents the "general interest of the Community" decisive influence over the Member States: at the dawn of an era of increasingly open economies and intensification of national and international competition, this was a formidably effective core of supranationality, the potential embryo of a future European government. This progressive integration enabled the continuing, step-by-step, construction of the elements of a European proto-nation. In 1945, the European nation was an abstract vision; today it is far less remote. The unity of European public opinion, both on the need to be resolute in combating international terrorism following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and on the error of the war in Iraq as a response to such terrorism, and the collective emotion felt in Europe towards the horror of the terrorist attacks on 11 March this year in Madrid bear witness to this evolution. Such was the paradoxical genius of the "Monnet method": clearing the way for building a political Europe in the long term by abandoning the idea of political integration in the short term. 1.3. The European model seeks to build a world of justice based on the indivisibility of human dignity. Moulded by their shared history, consolidated by the development of the Community, what are the common values shared by Europeans today? The answer relates to the special status the Europeans give to the human person. This anthropocentric thinking stems from Europe’s monotheistic tradition, according to which man is made in God’s image. It can likewise be found in the humanist tradition, which affirms, with Pic de la Mirandole, the indivisible principle of human dignity. European values are the bedrock of a specifically European model of society, which assigns central importance to human dignity. This model can be expressed simply: Europeans want to live in a world of justice. It is based on four constituent elements: the inviolability of human rights, a European culture, a model of development and a vision of the international order. 1.3.1. The inviolability of human rights Europe is widely identified with the defence of
human rights. These rights cover two aspects. Firstly, inviolability as regards the public sphere: this relates to different methods of limiting political power (habeas corpus, constitutional civil liberties, etc.). Emergency courts, corporal punishment and the death penalty have therefore been banned in Europe. Secondly, inviolability as regards domination by, or interference from, others. The idea that the individual must be protected against abuse arising from freedom of contracts has strongly influenced the concept of the rights of the individual. In labour law, for example, "social" provisions, which protect the worker by suspending the effects of one-sided clauses in employment contracts, are considered legitimate by all European countries. Lastly, inviolability as regards the self: in Europe, individuals are often protected against themselves, even though this places restrictions on their free choice. The case of legislation concerning non-commercialisation of the human body and its products stands out in particular. While individuals are free to sell their blood, semen and ova in the United States, the European States have nearly all laid down very restrictive legislation on both the commercial nature of these transactions and the principle itself. Secondly, human rights cover the principle of emancipation of individuals, the "positive freedoms". Emancipation is at the heart of European values: there is no such thing as human dignity if man is not politically and socially emancipated. Politically, Europeans express strong support for democracy. This is illustrated by the European Values Survey: 86% of those surveyed said they wanted "a democratic political system". The results are the same across Europe, including in eastern Europe. The democratic criterion can be used to draw distinctions between models of society at a global level: in Africa, Asia and South America, support for democracy is much weaker — less than 50% in most cases. Socially, Europeans now have a new set of values as regards their emancipation. The European Values Survey points to a gradual shift from traditional values (law and order, material security, strict social rules) to post-materialist values (personal expression, quality of life, tolerance and openness). Thus, in Europe, work is no longer considered to be only a source of income, an indicator of social status or an obligation to society: it is seen more and more as an opportunity for personal development and realisation of individual potential. Individuals also want to be able to strike a better balance between work and leisure. Liberal attitudes are gaining momentum as regards sexual orientation, social issues such as abortion or euthanasia and certain social behaviour such as the use of soft drugs. Of course, this long-term trend is developing at different rates in different countries; there has even been a slowdown in the last few years.31 Over a long period, however, this trend is clear and widespread. Often considered as the product of economic development, it is none the less more strongly marked in Europe than in the United States, where the population remains more attached to traditional values. 31 The European Values Survey even shows a fall-off in post-materialist values in the last decade in some countries such as France and the United Kingdom. 1.3.2. Culture as a means of emancipating the individual Culture is conceived in Europe as a means of emancipating the individual from the market sphere: his ancestry, his heritage and his history make the European a "cultured being", not simply a homo economicus. Culture is not a commodity; it should not be subjected entirely to economic laws. 32 On the contrary, it reflects the ideal of education and training. This ideal relates to the humanist model of "the honest man", a man educated in the collective culture and trained for citizenship. In practice, it manifests itself through the established presence in Europe of "general education", which aims to offer everyone the main elements of fundamental human culture. This common core of knowledge is found even in European vocational education, where training in a technical skill is supplemented by a general training in mathematics, literature and history. 32 Hence the demand for a "cultural exception", notably in the negotiations on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) at the OECD and in the context of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at the WTO. Nowhere in the world is there a concept of culture quite like the European one. It is characterised by interaction between institutions, collective beliefs, a common heritage, shared religious, artistic, philosophical and literary references, with a fairly high degree of similarity between the various ways of life. Just like the citizens of a nation state, the citizens of Europe enjoy a shared cultural base, which also engenders the feeling of a shared destiny. It is especially visible in the specific design of the towns, regions and landscapes. Everywhere in Europe, Europeans know they are in Europe. Furthermore, this European cultural unity goes hand in hand with the preservation of the great diversity among the cultures of each European country. This diversity is not incompatible with the shared definition of culture that the Europeans defend as a group. Very widespread in Europe, the assertion of the intrinsic value of cultural plurality follows from the belief that, in homogenisation, there will always be loss. This provokes the distrust that Europeans display towards every attempt at cultural proselytism or the desire to impose cultural references that are too unified. 1.3.3. A model of sustainable development: economic prosperity, social justice and ecology The European model of development has a doubly distinctive character within the western model based on the market economy. The first distinctive feature is the importance given to social justice: socially protecting the most vulnerable, limiting inequalities, ensuring risks are covered by public authorities. It is the expression of attachment to human life within European identity: human rights are, first of all, the rights of the poor; people must be protected against the larger risks in life that they cannot deal with alone — handicap, sickness, unemployment, old age. The double traumas of the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II have reinforced the collective desire for a fairer society, where everyone would have their basic needs satisfied and risks would be shared. This may explain the rapid expansion of the European model, in all the countries of western Europe, from 1945 onwards. Often described as a social market economy, this model offers a fair compromise between freedom and social justice, between production and redistribution, between market and State. It has created a virtuous circle. The market economy creates wealth. This wealth is redistributed in order to limit inequalities as much as possible and ensure social cohesion. This redistribution results in higher consumption, a source of growth and more prosperity. The public authorities play a central role in this model. They form the basis for the system of social justice, which comprises the system of taxation and social contributions, social protection arrangements (the welfare state) and direct provision of basic services (public services). This model is used in all the European States, to varying degrees. The level of taxes and charges is a good indicator of this. On average, it stood at 42% of GDP in the European Union, compared with 28% in Japan and the United States. The level of these charges in the European States is spread over a range of between 38% and 53% of GDP. Even the least redistributive European state (the United Kingdom) is therefore ten GDP points above the other large countries of the western world. The second specific characteristic of the European model is the attention focused on the environment. The sustained rhythm of economic development in the post-war period has caused perceptible damage to the environment: pollution, exhaustion of resources, deterioration of habitats and endangering of species. Although Europe is not the only region of the world where this has occurred, it is the only political area where ecological questions are explicitly taken into account today. Geographical conditions (limited territory, few natural resources, etc.) may well contribute to this awareness. Nevertheless, how can we fail to see that this is yet another example of the importance attached to human dignity, and, moreover, to life? In practice, the European States have, to varying degrees, implemented proactive policies in favour of the environment: the battle against urban pollution, support for clean and renewable sources of energy, strict industrial standards, etc. It is particularly at the Community level, however, that the most remarkable action has been taken. The European Union integrated the objective of protecting the environment into the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and subsequently adopted a Europe-wide environmental strategy. 33 It is on this basis that the Union has developed its courses of action: it fights actively in favour of observing the Kyoto agreements on greenhouse gas emissions; it stood alone, within the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), in its struggle to impose an international obligation of double-hull ships for the transport of oil and gas; it has established a European plan for the protection of fauna and flora, called Natura 2000; it has drawn up strict fisheries regulations — quotas, size of nets, bans on fishing for certain endangered species — to allow regeneration of fisheries resources.33 This strategy was defined at the Stockholm and Gothenburg European Councils (March and June 2001). At successive European Councils, the European Union has reflected on the specific nature of its model of development. It is founded on three "pillars": the economic pillar, the social pillar and the environmental pillar. It aims to be the first sustainable model of development, a model where the well-being of present generations is not achieved to the detriment of future generations. 1.3.4. A European vision of the international order: refusing to accept the law of the strongest For many, the international stage represents a "Hobbesian" state of nature, anarchic, and where order is obtained through power: international relations are the product of balances of power, the most powerful imposing its will unilaterally. Through the process of European integration, the nations of Europe have started revolutionising the international order. Horrified by the consequences of the Machtpolitik which led to two world wars, convinced meanwhile that the balance of power alone produces a dangerous and unstable world, they have abandoned the use of power in conducting their relationships with one another. Among themselves, they have applied an approach to international relations that first appeared in the 15th century and was developed in the 18th century with the various plans for perpetual peace and cosmopolitan law, and blueprints for international organisations, i.e. that of law. Relationships between States are peaceful and cooperative, war is no longer an option and conflicts are solved through negotiation and compromise or, failing that, the arbitration of a "trusted third party" (Commission, Court of Justice). Through the European Union, European nations have entered into a "Kantian" world of "perpetual peace". This is a unique accomplishment: the Union has succeeded where the League of Nations failed and the United Nations is struggling to impose its influence. Europe is now trying to champion this model on the international stage by encouraging multilateralism. It was responsible, together with Canada, for the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) with a view to providing a set of rules for global trade and helping to avoid trade wars, unilateral sanctions and the law of the jungle. It promotes regulation of the international financial system, through institutions such as G7, G10, G20 or the IMF, which deal with the structure of the international monetary and financial system, the Paris Club, which helps find solutions to developing countries’ public debt, the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which combats money laundering, and the OECD, which aims to combat international corruption and tax havens. It endeavours to provide support for institutions such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the IMO, and is seeking to set up a World Environment Organisation to ensure the effective implementation of international agreements on the environment. In particular, it works to safeguard the primacy of international law and the priority given to the peaceful resolution of disputes by the United Nations. This European vision has been both reinforced and
destabilised by the Iraq crisis. During the war in Iraq, it was formulated more
clearly than ever, as much by certain intellectuals as by a number of
governments. However, it also seemed impossible to reach a consensus during this
time. Secondly, the differences between governments do not, in themselves, imply a split in the European model. The existence of such a model does not imply that all governments, all political players and all European citizens fully share this view at all times. It would be called into question only if the dividing lines coincided with national boundaries, which would indicate a collection of national visions, rather than a European vision. However, this is not the case: the splits are primarily political. Furthermore, the same divergent trends can be observed in the United States, where there appears to be a unified vision only because it is expressed through the voice of a single entity: the Bush administration. If their institutional framework was comparable to that of the European Union, i.e. a group of fifty federated States able to adopt an autonomous official position on the international crisis, the variations would have looked very similar to those witnessed in Europe, as illustrated by the positions adopted by the authorities in California and, symbolically, New York. Finally, the divergences between the European governments concern the methods more than the objectives. All the governments share the same objective: the emergence of a multilateral framework founded on law. However, they advocate different means to attain it. Some think that, in the post-cold war period of today, it is vital that the international order is structured around the principle of law, and they try to achieve this even if it means opposing the United States. Conversely, others think that any attempt to impose an international order against the United States is doomed to failure, and adopt the strategy of trying to keep the United States in the multilateral system at all costs. The idea is to "trap Gulliver" in a more and more tangled web: while at present it could leave the multilateral system at any time, this will no longer be the case in the future. The example of the WTO illustrates this. When it was set up at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, the United States only agreed to join the organisation on condition that it did not contravene its national interests. Congress voted in favour of the United States withdrawing from the WTO if the organisation's jurisdiction system (the Dispute Settlement Body) returned three decisions against it. Initially, the European Commission refrained from attacking the United States befor |
